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"Experience has shown that one can find persons suffi-
ciently unbiased to determine more often truly than untruly
whether a thing has or has not happened, and usually to apply
justly and correctly an existing law to admitted or ascertained
facts." 1
"Finally he came to his third reason why an agreement
may not be possible. It turns on the problem of the adminis-
trator of the agreement. Here, he was vehement and unquali-
fied. He would never accept a single neutral administrator.
Why? Because, he said, while there are neutral countries,
there are no neutral men. He would not accept a Communist
administrator and I cannot accept a non-Communist admin-
istrator. I will never entrust the security of the Soviet Union
to any foreigner. We cannot have another Hammarskjold,
no matter where he comes from among the neutral countries.
I found this enlightening. It was plain to me that here
is a new dogma, that there are no neutral men. After all the
Soviet Union had accepted Trygve Lie and Hammarskjold.
The Soviet Government has now come to the conclusion that
there can be no such thing as an impartial civil servant in this
deeply divided world, and that the kind of political celibacy
which the British theory of the civil service calls for is in inter-
national affairs a fiction. This new dogma has long conse-
quences. It means that there can be international cooperation
only if, in the administration as well as in the policy-making,
the Soviet Union has a veto." 2
"Impartiality," Chief Justice Hughes wrote, "is not a technical
conception. It is a state of mind." 3 Professor Thomas M. Franck
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1 WOOLF & THE FABIAN SocI y, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT, 70-71 (1916).
2 Interview of Chairman Khrushchev by Walter Lippmann, N.Y. Herald Tribune,
Apr. 17, 1961, at 2, cols. 5-6.
3 United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145 (1936).
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has undertaken the monumental task of exploring an international state
of mind which is the core issue in settling many international disputes:
the concept of impartiality. The central question is the one posed by
Chairman Khrushchev in his interview with Walter Lippmann: can
there ever be a truly impartial decision-maker in the international
sphere?
An understanding of the nature of impartiality-and especially of
what it is not 4 -might lead to acceptance of international third-party
decision-making or adjudication. So far, virtually no progress has
been made towards such acceptance. For as Professor Franck points
out, in the past half century the choice of military weapons available to
members of the international community for settlement of disputes has
grown immensely while legal methods of adjustment have scarcely
added a single new device to the armory of peaceful settlement. No
breakthrough in the direction of peaceful third-party lawmaking can be
expected in the international community until the problem of the im-
partiality of decision-makers is satisfactorily resolved. No adminis-
trative or judicial decision-making system, except in a dictatorship, can
be widely accepted or routinely resorted to until the essential credential
of impartiality has been established. In Professor Frank's opinion, the
failure of the international community to develop a system of third-
party lawmaking comparable to that of the national community may
well prove to be the fatal error of our civilization.
The impartiality about which Professor Franck writes is not the
mechanical impartiality of two men settling a dispute by flipping a coin.
All decisions made by human judges embrace the subjectivity of hu-
man perception. The impartiality of a decision-maker is the detachment
achieved by not identifying with one of the disputing parties. How-
ever, this does not mean that he will not have biases. Impartiality is
not "preneutrality." 5
Society has a preference for decisions which are consistent with
that which has gone before. To meet this expectation the internation-
ally impartial person need not be divinely infallible, but he must not be
responsive to every whim of public feeling. Impartiality is the subjec-
tive characteristic by which the international decision-maker achieves a
reputation for consistency. How to develop this reputation and nurture
trust in the decision-maker is the theme of Professor Franck's discussion
of impartiality.
Since law does not claim to develop absolute truths, as do religion
and science, the individual or state confronted with the application of
international law is inclined to be dubious about assurances of fairness
4 Professor Franck points out that impartiality is not objectively definable except
in terms of what it is not.
5 "Preneutrality" has been described as complete neutrality of thought in the
decision-maker. See C. DEViSSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTMRNATIONAL
LAW 306-07 (1957).
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or rationality in the international decision-maker. Thus, there is need
for a standard against which a decision can be measured. This means
that if a judge is to be considered impartial, there must be a body of
law sufficiently developed to provide standards that, while not absolute
in the scientific or theological sense, are at least formulated, generalized
hypotheses. These standards will be the test of impartiality. While
there is a substantial body of such law in treaties and agreed-upon
custom, Professor Franck persuasively argues that there is an additional,
overlooked area-the customary conduct of states. He states that even
communist countries concede on occasion the existence of international
laws binding because of general community acceptance even though
unendorsed by the state in question. In Professor Franck's words it is
inevitable
that rights of one are circumscribed by the rights of others,
and that all human and national conduct, because it affects
other members of the community, must constantly be shaped
and limited by considerations of mutual accommodation.6
The impartial decision-maker may be subjected to two forms of
bias-inducing pressure: external and internal. The external pressures,
such as bribes or threats to personal security, are more easily controlled
than the internal pressures like the psychology and morality of the de-
cision-maker. Professor Franck explores methods of controlling in-
ternal pressures on the decision-maker, and suggests that a useful be-
ginning towards psychological impartiality would be international appli-
cation of the basic legal maxim that no man shall be a judge of his
own case.
In this connection, he recommends that judges of an international
court not be permitted to sit on cases where their own countries are
parties before the court, and, of course, that the special ad hoc judge be
eliminated from panels of the court. Professor Franck goes even
further, saying that judges whose nations or citizenship have a political
or economic stake in the outcome of a dispute should not be called upon
to decide the dispute even though they are not parties to it, and, more-
over, that persons should not even be called upon to decide a controversy
who are citizens of states allied with a disputant or who are known to
have strong personal feelings of friendship or antipathy toward a dis-
puting state. Professor Franck proposes a modified form of the
Missouri Plan for use in selection of judges for the International Court
of Justice. His plan would include a selection method based upon
acceptability of the individual by his professional peers, his national
government, and the community of states. In order to remain in office,
he would have to retain approval of all three. Thus the decision-maker
6T. FRANCK, THE STRUCTURE OF IMPARTIALITY 130 (1968).
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would be exposed to, and conditioned by, a balance of influences struc-
tured to make him responsive to all but captive to none.
Professor Franck notes that the judge often appears to be just
another interfering social worker to those equipped to look after their
own interests. On the other hand, the large powers have an important
stake in making sure that the use of third-party methods of international
settlement become routine procedure. If they do not they may easily be
drawn into nuclear confrontations, even in situations where their in-
terests are not at stake. Although not every dispute is subject to de-
cision by a court or by impartial body, it is evident that a great number
are.
Professor Franck believes that it is a mistake to limit the parties
which may appear before the World Court to states. Not only will the
judge know far too much about the parties before him, but psycholog-
ically it makes too prominent the fact that the dispute pits one country
against another in the decision-making process. The affected indi-
viduals tend to get lost in the shuffle. He correctly points out that if the
Supreme Court of the United States from the beginning had been as-
signed to do nothing but decide disputes between states of the Union,
or suits attacking state action, it long ago would have been relegated to
judicial history's refuse heap.7
International courts provide the impartiality that Professor Franck
thinks is absent when national courts apply international law in deciding
disputes. Consider, for example, the potential charge of partiality in the
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino 8 decision had the parties been
reversed and a Cuban court dismissed a suit by an American plaintiff.
Such charges of prejudice might also have been levelled against Turkey
in the Lotus Case,' if the Turkish Court had been content to determine
7 Professor Franck does not discuss the problem of the execution of the writ in a
suit between individuals before an international court. Would the writ be enforceable
within the losing party's country, and would it be subject to collateral attack in
national courts?
8 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), rev'd 376 U.S. 398 (1964). A New York
buyer contracted with a Cuban corporation to buy sugar. After the Cuban govern-
ment nationalized the selling company and the buyer signed a new contract with the
converted corporation, which subsequently delivered the sugar, the New York court
appointed a receiver to administer New York assets of the nationalized company.
Included among the assets were the proceeds from the sale, which the buyer turned
over to the receiver. Dismissing an action brought by the Cuban company against
the buyer and the receiver, the lower court held that the nationalization violated
international law and refused to enforce the Cuban law. Reversing the district court,
the Court held, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Harlan, that although the United States
can apply international law as part of its own law in appropriate circumstances, "the
public law of nations can hardly dictate to a country which is in theory wronged
how to treat that wrong within its domestic borders." Id. at 423.
) Case of the S.S. "Lotus," [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 9; see J. BRIERLY, THE:
LA v oF NATIONS 301-04 (1963). A French officer was prosecuted in the Turkish
Courts for criminal negligence in a collision between the French ship Lotus and a
Turkish ship, which caused the death of a Turkish crewman. Rejecting the defense
of lack of jurisdiction, the International Court of Justice held that Turkey did have
jurisdiction over persons causing injury within Turkish territory. The ship was
in Turkish territory in this case.
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for itself whether it had jurisdiction over a French naval officer. But
submission to the International Court gave the Turkish court's decision
an imprimatur of international impartiality. Such an imprimatur could
be insured in other cases by a procedure in which decisions of national
courts that interpret treaties or decide other issues of international law
between citizens of different states be subject to review by international
tribunals.
Referring to ancient thinkers and early cases from many countries,
he relates the problems they faced and the solutions they developed to
the problems facing the international community today. For example,
he contrasts Ghengis Kahn's skill in obtaining the support of local
people with the corresponding inability of General Westmoreland,
thereby relating past and present, East and West.
Although the title may be somewhat foreboding, it is a very read-
able book. It has the casual style of an informal talk, although the con-
versational nature of the book is impaired occasionally by phrases such
as, "[T] he uniqueness of the existential relativism in the order-creating
system of judge-made law .... " Professor Franck is also given to
excessive use of italics.
Lastly, it is an important book because it focuses on the real prob-
lem retarding the acceptance of third-party international decision-mak-
ing: the question of impartiality. Impartiality is not only a necessity for
the international arbiter, it is a fundamental prerequisite to the accept-
ance of an international civil service and an international governing
body. Until countries are satisfied that the United Nationsis impartial,
quasi-legislative acts of the General Assembly will be ignoied, and
specialized committees will find their solutions to world problems con-
sidered suspect. Professor Franck has opened a dialogue which should
be studied, replied to, and dissected. The book should be valuable
supplementary reading in any course dealing with international law.
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